Religion and Healing the Mind/Body/Self by McGuire, Meredith B
Trinity University 
Digital Commons @ Trinity 
Sociology & Anthropology Faculty Research Sociology and Anthropology Department 
3-1996 
Religion and Healing the Mind/Body/Self 
Meredith B. McGuire 
Trinity University, mmcguire@trinity.edu 
Follow this and additional works at: https://digitalcommons.trinity.edu/socanthro_faculty 
 Part of the Anthropology Commons, and the Sociology Commons 
Repository Citation 
McGuire, M. B. (1996). Religion and healing the mind/body/self. Social Compass, 43(1), 101-116. doi: 
10.1177/003776896043001008 
This Article is brought to you for free and open access by the Sociology and Anthropology Department at Digital 
Commons @ Trinity. It has been accepted for inclusion in Sociology & Anthropology Faculty Research by an 
authorized administrator of Digital Commons @ Trinity. For more information, please contact jcostanz@trinity.edu. 
Social Compass 43(1), 1996, 101-116 
Meredith B. McGUIRE 
Religion and Healing the Mind/Body /Self 
Pour comprendre le lien entre religion et sante, ii convient de depasser 
le theme de la regulation du corps. Bien que la religion implique la 
regulation et le controle du corps et bien que /es pratiques de guerison 
refletent ces fonctions, les relations entre le corps humain et la religion 
s'operent encore de bien d'autres manieres. Nous parviendrons a une 
comprehension plus riche de ce lien en recourant a une approche 
sociologique large du corps humain, de ses maladies et de so guerison en 
posant cette vaste question: Comment la religion est-elle impliquee dons 
ces processus complexes? Plus encore, je pretends que pour comprendre 
la nature de la guerison, nous devons considerer non seulement le corps 
physique, mais encore /es relations entre ce dernier, /'esprit, le moi et la 
societe. Des raisons theoriques et empiriques militent en faveur de cette 
conceptualisation unitaire. lors de mes observations touchant des prati­
ques de guerison non medicates, dons le cadre d'unfaubourg residentiel 
d'une cite americaine, pour prendre un exemple, j'ai decouvert que pour 
/es partisans de differentes pratiques de guerison, le but attribue a cette 
derniere eta it la trans/ ormation du moi, voire dons cert a ins cos so 
transcendance (McGuire, 1988). Notre discipline doit non seulement 
considerer que /'esprit, le corps et la societe sont relies, mais encore les 
reconceptualiser en tenant compte de leur prof on de interpenetration, 
c'est-a-dire /es saisir com me s'ils f ormaient un phenomene quasi unitaire 
(McGuire, 1990). 
In order to understand the linkage between religion and healing, we must go 
well beyond the theme of body regulation. Although religion does involve 
body regulation and control, and although these functions are reflected in 
healing practices, there are many other ways by which religion is linked with 
human bodies. We will arrive at a far richer appreciation of this linkage if 
we start with a broad sociology of the human body, its illnesses and healing, 
and ask the expanded question: How is religion involved in these complex 
processes? 
In order to understand the nature of healing, we must address not merely 
the physical body, but the entire interconnection of body, mind, self and 
society. There are both theoretical and empirical reasons for employing 
this unitary conceptualization. For example, in my earlier empirical 
examination of non-medical healing in an economically comfortable sub­
urban US area, I found that adherents of widely differing healing 
approaches considered the ultimate purpose of healing to be the transforma­
tion (and in some cases, transcendence) of the self (McGuire, 1988). Our 
discipline needs to reconceptualize mind, body and society, not merely as 
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connected, but rather as deeply interpenetrating, meshed as a near-unitary 
phenomenon (McGuire, 1990). 
Disembodied Believers, Un-Emotional Minds, Objectivated 
Selves 
Our discipline has been impoverished by an uncritical acceptance of an 
epistemological tradition in which things of the spirit have been radically 
split from material things, and in which mind is treated as utterly separate 
from body (cf. Gordon, 1988; Kirmayer, 1988). Where, in our studies of 
religious beliefs, believers and organizations, for instance, is there any 
recognition that people so much as hove bodies, or that their bodies are 
related to others' bodies, or that these bodies matter very much? 
When the sociology of religion has attended to the minds of believers, it 
has emphasized almost exclusively the cognitive functions of the mind, 
ignoring or relegating to psychologists the attempt to understand how 
religion is linked with people's emotions, perceptions, senses and feelings, 
imagination, and memory. As a result, our discipline has grave difficulties 
interpreting such important religious features as intersubjective experiences, 
healing and other ritual practices, and fundamental religious experiences -
all of which involve social, yet often non-cognitive, processes of minds and 
bodies. Implicit in this approach is the tendency to objectify religion; in so 
doing, sociology of religion forfeits the possibility of grasping the dynamic, 
experiential, subjectively meaningful, emotionally exciting, indeterminate, 
motivating and active aspects of religion. 
Let us assume that the human body is both a biological and a cultural pro­
duct, physical and symbolic, always framed in a specific social and 
environmental context in which the body/mind is both active agent and yet 
influenced by each social moment and its cultural history (Scheper-Hughes 
and Lock, 1987). Let us appreciate that a person's subjective sense of self is 
intimately linked with body/mind. We experience things done to our bodies 
as done to our selves. In continually revised biographical memories, we 
accomplish narratives which give subjective meaning to our bodily and 
emotional experiences. Through our body/minds we experience our 
world - experiences of illness, pain, chronic disabilities and death, experi­
ences of hunger and cold, experiences of childbearing, birth, nursing, experi­
ences of aesthetic pleasures, sexual pleasures, and sensuous pleasures (such 
as the taste of "comfort food", the sound of a lullaby, a friend's supportive 
caress). 
Until relatively recently, most sociological research focused on ideas about 
the body; this emphasis unfortunately promotes a tendency to disembody the 
very object of our study. In order to understand the role of religion in heal­
ing, we must go deeper than believers' ideas, attitudes, norms - although 
these are not irrelevant. The experiences of suffering, pain and illness are not 
merely "in the body" or "in the mind or spirit" ; rather, they are experienced 
by the whole person as assaults on the body/mind/self. If we approach pain 
and suffering from the perspective of medicine's Cartesian dualism, we 
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produce an image of healing as a mere epiphenomena! add-on, something 
the mind or spirit was doing after the body was suffering. When we abandon 
the limiting epistemology implicit in the oppositions of mind and body, 
nature and culture, and individual and society, we can explore deeper and 
more far-reaching ways by which religion can be linked with the health and 
healing of the body/mind/self. 
This article will outline some of the highly suggestive analytical approaches 
toward understanding these complex linkages. These approaches each have 
their limitations (although there is not space here to develop critiques of 
them), and we should avoid uncritically combining interpretations with con­
tradictory epistemological assumptions. Nevertheless, while our analysis is 
still in an exploratory stage, there is much to be gained by considering 
insights from multiple, even contradictory, perspectives. 
Using social theories of health and healing as theoretical springboards, I 
will outline some of the thoroughfares by which the individual's body, mind, 
self and society interpenetrate, constituting a unitary phenomenon. It is best 
to think of these thoroughfares, not as stationary paths between locations, 
but rather as ongoing, changing processes - indeterminate, yet constitutive 
of the unitary body/mind/self. I propose that a central task of the sociology 
of religion is to explore the role of religion in these processes. In so doing, 
we will better understand, not only how religious healing "works", but also 
a wide range of religious experiences, ritual practices, alternative ways of 
knowing, and experiential bases of religious community. 
The Body in Question 
In order to explore how peoples' bodies are affected by and, simultaneously, 
influence their minds, selves and social situations, it is helpful to consider 
that bodies are involved at multiple levels. Indeed, it is the fact that the body 
referent can operate at more than one level at once that makes healing and 
other symbolic actions effective. For example, among the Yolmo of the 
Nepal Himalayas, healing involves understanding vast and rich body signi­
ficance. Bodies are like geometers, representing simultaneously cultural geo­
graphies of Yolmo villages, families and households, physical maps linking 
anatomy and cosmology, senses and orientations: 
Pasang's fingers, for instance, are said to index the gods of the five directions: east, 
south, west, north, center. The syllables of the Buddhist prayer om mani padme hum 
register metonymically within her forehead, shoulders, navel, genitals, and feet, while 
the Buddhist invocation of deities om u hum (body, speech, mind) sounds through her 
rtser tshugs, voice box, and stomach. The incorporeal rtser tshugs, an entryway into the 
body just above the fontanel, houses protective gods. Deities also defend the other eight 
"gates" to the body: the eyes, nostrils, ears, mouth, and anus ... Deities and knowledge 
inhabit an anatomy much as villages lie at specific sites along a pilgrim's route ... Yolmo 
bodies, like the temples of lamas, are dense with meaning. (Desjarlais, 1992: 39-42) 
Following Scheper-Hughes and Lock (1987), we may distinguish these multi­
ple levels as (a) the lived or experiential body, (b) the political body, and (c) 
the social body (McGuire, 1990). 1 
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The lived body 
The material reality of our bodies is part of the grounding of human 
experience in reality: the "lived" body is our vehicle for perce�ving and inter­
preting, for knowing and interact�ng with o�r worlds. A�cor.
dmg to .Merlea.
u­
Ponty (1962), this "lived" body2 1s the basis of our subjective reality, whtle 
simultaneously it is the vehicle for perceiving and engaging others. We 
experience our bodies in terms of "presence" - an immediately lived sensa­
tion, locating ourselves in relation to other perceived objects. This experi­
ence of embodied presence is both reflexive (as sensation of oneself) and 
relational (as presence to others). 
Arguing against Descartes' separation of matters of the mind from 
material matters, Merleau-Ponty argues that perception requires unitary 
body and mind involvement in even the most basic instances of sensing. He 
emphasizes that the lived-body's capacity for self-mov:ment, �s a resu�t �f 
perception, is the basis of human agency. He asserts, Consciousness 1s m 
the first place not a. matter of 'I think that' but of 'I can' " (Merleau-Ponty, 
1962: 37). 
Any study of healing must take into account that pain, suffering
. 
and 
illness are often experienced by the lived body as assaults; they result m an 
experiential sense of dis-ease. The lived body is not the same as the body-as­
object. Thus, the objective character of a body that a doctor labels "diseased" 
bears little resemblance to the person's subjective, lived-body experience of 
being ill. Through the lived body, we know our bodies as subject, as 
intimately experienced; by contrast, social bodies and pol�tical bodi�s t�n.d to transform bodies into objects - objects of power, objects of sc1enuf1c 
analysis, objects of medical intervention, objects of social control, objects 
for commodification, and so on. Cultural objectivations of the body can 
subsequently act back on the lived body, shaping the quality of its expres­
sions and even self-experience. 
The body and relations of power 
A second level of body referent is the political body, through which the 
body is linked with relations of power. Power is probably the central 
analytical theme in the sociology of health and illnes�. Interestingly, po:-ver 
and relations of power are also central to understanding other ways society 
profoundly affects the body: sexuality, reproduction and gender issues 
(Bordo, 1989; Martin, 1987), war, torture and domestic abuse (Cooey, 19�5; 
Feldman, 1991; Scarry, 1985), the conditions and relations of production 
and consumption (Featherstone, 1991; Freund, 1982), and so on. These 
examples all show that the body is both an instrument of power and the site 
of struggles' over power. Although the theme of body regulation is too 
narrow, it is none the less one important way by which powerful social 
forces, including religion, influence the body. 
Control, discipline, regulation. From the earliest formulations of Freud, 
Marx and Weber, social theorists have analyzed religion's role in social con­
trol and body regulation. Religion's role in body regulation is often indirect, 
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such as when religion is used to legitimate social structures like slavery or 
cultural patterns like body mutilation. Religion has exercised more direct 
control of bodies by itself promulgating moral norms controlling sexuality, 
reproduction, eating, drinking, entertainments, modesty, cleanliness and 
purity. 
Weber's studies of religion (especially the Protestant sects) and the 
emergence of rationalized forms of consciousness make another connection 
between religious control and the human body. Accordingly, ascetic disci­
pline is the application of rationalization to the concrete individual body: 
religion regulates the body through a regimen of diet, hygiene, posture and 
exercise, self-denial, and a disciplined schedule of hours for sleep, prayer, 
work, etc. (Turner, 1992a: 115-138). Pursuing Weber's rationalization 
thesis, Bryan Turner (1984, 1992b) suggests four aspects of societal body­
regulation: control over reproduction of populations, spatial regulation of 
bodies, disciplines that internally restrain the body, and the control over 
appearances or body representations. Rationalized patterns of social control 
have spread well beyond their cultures of origin, transported through col­
onialism, globalized industrialization, and other transnational exercises of 
power. For example, colonial powers promoted disciplines, such as regimens 
for hygiene and public health, thereby controlling indigenous populations 
through self-constraint and not merely by external coercion (Comaroff and 
Comaroff, 1991). 
Just as Weber hypothesized that different forms of religion uninten­
tionally produced the kinds of individual habits, attitudes and motivations 
appropriate to various patterns of socio-economic organization (e.g. the 
"spirit of capitalism"), so too some recent sociological theories suggest that 
social control exists to produce "appropriate" bodies for late modern social 
conditions, especially conditions of production and consumption (Freund, 
1988; Lock and Scheper-Hughes, 1990). The "appropriate" body/mind/self 
is "civilized", as illustrated by Elias's (I 978, 1982) analysis of the develop­
ment of etiquette and Freund's (1982) examination of contemporary working 
conditions and roles. Core cultural values, such as competitiveness, youth 
and self-control are reproduced, for example, in Euro-American politically 
correct bodies, which are lean, strong, tightly controlled and fit (Crawford, 
1984; Bordo, 1990). 
Hochschild's (1983) study of training of flight attendants documents the 
considerable self-constraint over body and emotions - both in their expres­
sion and in their very experience - expected of many contemporary workers. 
This kind of self-constraint and emotion-work is increasingly involved in 
producing bodies/minds "appropriate" for modern forms of work that 
require representing oneself - indeed, selling oneself as expertise or as ser­
vice. Foucault (1977, 1980) described a western historical process culminat­
ing in a high degree of subtle coercion, surveillance, and use of "technologies 
of power" that regulate body rhythms, gestures and motion, and use of 
space. Accordingly, these technologies penetrate the "soul" and come to con­
trol from within the individual, resulting in docile bodies, socially regulated 
largely by self-constraint. 
When we frame the linkage of religion and the body in terms of regulation, 
we must confront the themes of power, coercion and (often) violence. Who 
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controls whom? What are the sanctions, no matter how subtle, for deviance? 
How do power relations produce bodily and emotional illness; how do they 
also serve healing functions? Under what circumstances does religion 
legitimate oppressive social control of bodies/minds; when does it promote 
liberation? 
Bodies in resistance, voices of dissent. Although body regulation and con­
trol are the most obvious ways power affects the body, another vivid instance 
of the political aspect of bodies is when they are used to express dissent or 
resistance. Some illness episodes have just such political significance. For 
example, the disruptive outbreaks of spirit possession among Malaysian 
factory workers (Ong, 1988) and the language of mentally ill homeless 
persons in the US (Desjarlais, 1994) are clearly political statements against 
the social controls and dehumanizing conditions imposed by powerful 
others. As such, they resemble strategies of passive resistance. Scheper­
Hughes and Lock ( 19 9 1: 423) remind us: "illness is also an act of refusal ... 
assuming the sick role (especially the chronic sick role) signifies a refusal to 
endure, to cope. It says, 'I will not any longer' ". 
A more active and creative use of the body-in-resistance is exemplified by 
the many self-portraits of Frida Kahlo. Cooey ( 1994) observes: 
Her body painted, over and over, is an artifact, a made thing. As made thing it maps 
a relation between her lived body as site and a cultural process of signification ... This 
mapping ... is marked by resistance - resistance to pain, resistance to conventional 
views of gender difference and female sexuality, and resistance to depoliticizing art, 
emotional life, and gender. {p. 107) 
Often, however, illness is not an effective political form, partly because of 
resisters' lack of power and inability to have their voice taken seriously. Like 
a scream, illness may be a highly expressive political act that is ignored or, 
worse yet, is used against the sick person as discrediting evidence. Thus, the 
alcoholism of a Native American may be a clear expression of resistance to 
the power of the dominant US or Canadian society, but it is ultimately self­
defeating (Scheper-Hughes and Lock, 1991). 
Although use of illness to express political resistance is often effective 
merely as a safety valve or opiate, its expression is potentially like revolu­
tionary drama, giving resisters a voice. Indeed, expression of dissent may 
(occasionally) effect "healing" by literally acting out social-political con­
tradictions. The political potential of even faintly resistant body/mind 
expressions is evident in oppressors' attempts to forbid them. For example, 
in the 1980s China experienced a qigong "craze", attracting tens of millions 
to the practice of new forms of traditional breathing and body exercises, 
often in the context of huge gatherings. Some forms, such as "crane" qigong, 
emphasize spontaneous bodily and emotional expression, frequently in 
frenzied catharsis and ecstasy (which violate strong Chinese cultural norms). 
The rise of qigong practice apparently parallels the dashing of hopes of 
democratization and, especially in its spontaneous forms, qigong is a way of 
bodily and emotionally expressing protest against contemporary repression 
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and years of suffering under the Cultural Revolution ( 1966-1978). The fact 
that by the end of the 1980s Chinese authorities were systematically suppress­
ing and delegitimating spontaneous forms of qigong shows the political 
potential of expressive bodies (Ots, 1994). 
Many persons expressing dissent or resistance through their bodies do so 
relatively unawares and incoherently, because they lack understanding of the 
sources of their suffering and access to effective ways to articulate what they 
do understand. Theirs is more of a lived protest. 
The social body 
The third avenue for the interpenetration of body, mind, self and society is 
the social body. Since Durkheim, our discipline has been aware that human 
bodies are important symbols of social meanings. Likewise, society uses 
body parts, postures and functions, not only to represent meanings but also 
to reproduce or transform them. Furthermore, for the individual member of 
society, these body images and meanings are linked with conceptions of one's 
self and one's relationship with the larger material and social environment. 
Anthropologists have considered the human body, its parts (e.g. the 
stomach, the shoulders) and products (e.g. sweat, milk, blood) to be a cogni­
tive pattern, like a map, representing important social relations. Douglas 
(1966, 1970) referred to the body as a "natural symbol" which can be used 
metaphorically; she observed, for example, how concerns about the body 
frequently serve as metaphors for social concerns like order and boundary 
maintenance. 
Illness is often a metaphorical expression of people's somatic, emotional 
and social concerns, literally embodied in the sick person's experience of 
pain, suffering or disability. For example, in Iran, a "pressed heart" is a 
culturally meaningful idiom for expressing distress, linking a set of social 
concerns: infertility, attractiveness, sexual intercourse, pollution and old age 
(Good, 1977). Similarly, in China a wide range of problematic feelings are 
expressed somatically (e.g. anger is identified with the liver, anxiety with the 
heart, and melancholy with the spleen), because of a cultural tradition of 
repressing emotions, due to strong norms to produce correct social behavior 
(Ots, 1990). These feelings are not merely translated into somatic metaphors 
for communication, but are experienced somatically. 
Although each culture has its own repertoire of meaningful idioms of 
distress, there are often interesting cross-cultural similarities in both physical 
and social-emotional features. One study compared descriptions of "nerves" 
as an illness experience in Kentucky, Newfoundland, Costa Rica, Guatemala 
and Puerto Rico. Low ( 1994) observed that in all five cultures, "nerves" is 
the embodiment of adverse existential conditions and disorder (e.g. family 
disruption, personal loss, political terrorism, desperate poverty), expressed 
through culturally recognizable bodily experience. She concludes: "Nerves 
embodiment, thus, can communicate the disintegration and breakdown of 
the self/society contract in explicitly bodily terms with the body disturbances 
reflecting the nature of that disturbance" (Low, 1994: 157). 
Even when it has socio-psychological sources, however, distress is not 
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simply "in the mind" but also is a bodily phenomenon. For example, Low's 
study found that the experience of "nerves" involves emotional experiences 
(e.g. sense of anxiety, fear, "going to pieces"), inextricably interwoven with 
physical sensations (e.g. body aches, sweats, weakness, trembling) and a 
generalized disturbed sense of body (e.g. sense of one's body so changed that 
it is not recognizable). Western medicine's labeling such illness as psycho­
somatic or psychogenic delegitimates, trivializes and distorts people's real 
suffering. For instance, to label the suffering of a Salvadoran refugee in the 
US as "post-traumatic stress disorder" is to isolate and euphemize the conse­
quences of pervasive political violence (Kleinman, 1992; Kleinman and 
Kleinman, 1991). 
Thus, the social body (with its cultural repertoire of metaphorical mean­
ings) is connected to the political body (with its contentions over power to 
define ideology and the very terms of discourse about the body). When the 
metaphorical meanings of body are culturally imposed by a dominant 
ideology, they have the potential to inflict on some persons (especially the 
relatively powerless, such as minorities and women) a negative self-image, 
further distress, ill bodily and emotional experiences, and often outright 
abuse (cf. Cooey, 1995). Because such ideology is imposed coercively and 
often is religiously legitimated, it simultaneously causes suffering and robs 
sufferers of the validity of their own experiences. For example, those in 
power can say: "Your pain isn't real; it's all in your head," or "You bring your 
suffering on yourself by not being a 'good' woman." 
Nevertheless, the social meanings of the body point to how healing is 
possible: when body metaphors and symbols are ritually realigned or recon­
nected, the sick person may experience a body/mind/self transformation 
culturally identified as wholeness or healing. Thus, in healing, the body is 
inextricably linked with processes such as imagination, symbolization, 
language and memory. Because the body/mind/self operates as a unitary 
phenomenon, it includes emotions, memories, postures, senses, balance 
(in more than merely the physical sense of the word), relationships, self­
image, sense of empowerment, imagination, attitudes, spiritual qualities and 
processes. 
There is considerable evidence in anthropological studies that healing 
practices "work" by symbolically accomplishing real effects on the sick 
person's body-/mind-/self-experience (Csordas, 1994; Desjarlais, 1992; 
Kapferer, 1993; Lock, 1993; Stephen, 1989). Religions are, cross-culturally 
and historically, important sources of these social meanings and ritual prac­
tices (see Kasulis et al., 1993). The body /mind thoroughfares that make 
these effects plausible are suggested by the nature of ritual practice. 
Essentially, ritual practice is symbolically laden action (e.g. posture, 
gesture, pronouncement) the performance of which is intended to accomplish 
what it represents. Bourdieu (1977: 124) argues that in learning a culture 
the individual acquires, to some degree, "a socially informed body" which is 
structured by its learned tastes and distastes. Its socially shaped senses 
include not only such senses as smell or touch, but also the sense of beauty, 
sense of propriety, moral sense, sense of humor, sense of the sacred, sense 
of responsibility, and so on. Through cultural practices - some of which 
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are very mundane and usually unnoticed (such as routine postures and 
gestures) and some of which are milestone events (such as rituals of initia­
tion), individual bodies are informed, renewed or transformed. 
Body practices can make body metaphor a physical, mental and/ or emo­
tional reality. For example, in most East Asian Mahayana Buddhism, 
enlightenment involves the entire body/mind complex: "We become the 
buddha through our bodies," according to Kukai (774-835 c.e.), founder of 
Shingon Buddhism. Kukai emphasized use of specific spiritual practices to 
accomplish mental, verbal, and bodily intimacy with the buddha. Mental 
intimacy is established by various practices of meditation; verbal intimacy 
occurs through the discipline of the mantras, which are not merely repre­
sentations of ideas (much less verbal "prayers") but are literally bodily 
harmonizing with vibrations or resonances, produced in the sound of man­
tras. Behavioral intimacy occurs through body practices, disciplined bodily 
postures, especially hand gestures, which not only represent and express the 
meaning of enlightenment, but physically mimic gestures of the buddha 
which embody the buddha's own enlightenment. Accordingly, through these 
practices, enlightenment becomes a practical reality - not merely a meta­
physical theory: the practitioner embodies buddhahood (Kasulis, 1993). 
Thus, the human body is profoundly social. It is "shaped" to eat, sit, greet 
or dance in culturally specific ways. Its very senses are socially informed. 
Each culture imbues the body with myriad meanings which serve as both 
maps and repertoires for individual experience and expression. This mean­
ing, however, is not merely a cognitive or symbolic overlay. Rather, com­
parable to how the music of an etude becomes part of the ways of the hand 
(Sudnow, 1978) through ritual practice, social meanings become physically 
embodied. 
Religion and the Body 
As the above descriptions of mind/body/self thoroughfares suggest, for 
many individuals and in most cultures, religious feelings, senses, practices, 
and meanings are woven throughout. Although my initial goal in exploring 
these themes was to grasp how cultural practices (such as spiritual healing 
approaches) "work", this literature suggests a number of other important 
features of religion that are better understood using such a unitary concep­
tualization of mind/body/self. 
Religious feeling and emotion 
Religion is a particularly important social activity for analyzing this theme, 
because - more so than most human activities - religion allows (indeed, 
encourages) the total involvement and absorption of the body/mind/self. 
Although our analysis should include religious ideas (theologies, authorita­
tive texts, moral reasoning etc.), other aspects of religion may be more 
important. What features of religion make such thorough (and often, 
intense) involvement possible? Space does not allow for full examination of 
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how religion engages emotions, imagination, memory, perception and 
senses, which in turn are powerfully linked with bodies, but our discussion 
of the role of emotion will suggest some ways religion evokes this body/ 
mind/self involvement. 
Emotion may be the dynamic that mediates and integrates the lived body, 
the social body, and the political body (Lock and Scheper-Hughes, 1990). 
Emotions clearly affect how individuals experience their bodies, illnesses and 
pain; individual illness often reflects dysfunction or disruption of the social 
body and the body politic. Lock and Scheper-Hughes propose that emotions 
serve as bridges among these aspects of bodyliness, because they entail both 
feelings and cognitive orientations, public morality and cultural ideology, 
while simultaneously providing a force or intensity for interpersonal com­
munication and action. 
Lyon and Barbalet (1994) argue that emotion is the dynamic that makes 
bodies active (agents) and communicative expressions of self. This concep­
tualization is a useful corrective to overly-deterministic images of body as 
produced by and subject to powers-that-be (political bodies). Accordingly, 
the human capacity for social agency arises from the experiential realization 
of our presence in the world. They further note that emotion is not only 
embodied but also fundamentally social - not an inner thing but a "rela­
tional process". 
Building on Merleau-Ponty's phenomenology of the senses, Cataldi ( 1993) 
describes emotion as "living meaning", as parallel to the experiential, 
ongoing character of the "lived body" described above. She argues that 
emotional depth involves changes in our identities and transformative leaps 
in the patterns of our perceptions. Like body practices, emotion practices 
(which she views as ways of patterning perception) serve to inform and 
transform the self. Cataldi (1993: 174-175) states: 
We speak, for example, of being in awe or of standing in reverence, of being in mourning 
when we are deeply grieved, and in despair when we are deeply in sorrow, in terror, in 
agony or in ecstacy, in love, or in remorse. This in is an in of "inmergion• ... In 
experiences of emotional depth, we, as embodied beings, are "in" a sensitive space and 
experience ourselves as in-merged with-in a surface of sensibility ... The "deepest" of 
our emotional experiences are those "in" which the body-world boundary is de-bordered 
or altered to such an extent that intentional and dichotomous characterizations of the 
emotional experience break down. 
She likens the very deepest of these experiences to what William James (1958: 
61) called an "undifferentiated sense of reality", "as if there were in the 
human consciousness a sense of reality, a feeling of objective presence". 
Thus, the lived body and living meaning (deep emotion) are connected with 
profound religious experiences of intense intersubjectivity (communion) and 
mystical experiences (union). 
This description of intense body/mind involvement parallels what 
Csikszentmihalyi (1990) calls "flow". He observed that his respondents, 
skilled participants in activities requiring high levels of mental and physical 
concentration (e.g. rock climbers, chess masters, surgeons), described a 
special, holistic state of consciousness/sensation during periods of intense 
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involvement. Csikszentmihalyi uses the term "flow" for this experience in 
order to capture the sense of a dynamic current, in which the individual feels 
in control of her or his actions, yet experiences little distinction between self 
and environment, stimulus and response, past, present and future. The 
individual remains an active agent, but the self dissolves and the person 
becomes immersed/one with the activity (Spickard, 1993). 
Religious practice 
Sociology of religion needs to study the cultural practices by which ideas, 
feelings, senses literally become embodied. Specifically, in order to under­
stand healing and other religious practices by which the entire body/mind/ 
self are affected, we need to analyze uses of symbols and rituals by which 
believers may transform their selves. We need to examine how body practices 
(such as ritual touching or maintaining ritual postures) may effect desired 
changes in emotions, cognitions, sensations or spiritual awarenesses. How 
do rhythms (such as ritual percussion), resonances of sound, patterns of 
chant, dance, and so on, shape the body/mind/self? We need to appreciate 
how everyday body practices (such as preparing and eating food) serve as 
complex, multi-level symbols (for example, simultaneously evoking mean­
ings of spiritual, social, emotional, and bodily nourishment). Even such 
seemingly mundane cultural practices may affect a person's entire well-being 
and accomplish healing. 
Are there not also religious practices, such as visualization, meditation 
and collective remembering that may effect real changes in the individual's 
body/mind/self? (See Csordas, 1994; Desjarlais, 1992; Leder, 1990; 
Stephen, 1989.) If emotions and other aspects of the mind are thoroughly 
influenced by and themselves interpenetrate the many aspects of the body, 
then religious practices which symbolically rearrange these meanings can be 
literally transformative. 
Alternative ways of knowing 
One important theme for further inquiries is how bodily and emotional self­
experience are linked with ways of knowing. Western society has been 
mistrustful of non-cognitive apprehension and non-linear, non-rational 
ways of knowing; accordingly emotion has no place in scientific discourse 
(Jaggar, 1989; Lutz, 1990). Rather than seeing emotion and reason as 
mutually exclusive, we could view them as two mutually generative aspects 
of the mind. Sociology of religion needs to explore the emotional component 
of ways of knowing, since much religious belief and behavior otherwise 
appears to be utterly irrational. Might an acceptance and refinement of our 
own emotional - as well as cognitive - ways of knowing enable us, as 
scholars, to better comprehend the experiences of those whom we purport 
to explain? 
In western science, bodies are used as "tools" by which we gather our 
empirical observations, but "knowledge" is viewed as a purely mental opera­
tion. Might bodies, however, be more immediately involved in our ways of 
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knowing? Even as social researchers, our bodies are our fundamental 
phenomenological basis for knowing our everyday worlds and interacting 
with them. Thus, to a certain extent, most knowledge - even empirical 
ways of knowing - is deeply linked with the body and its culturally formed 
senses. By inattention to the importance of our bodies' role in apprehending 
our worlds, we are missing the opportunity to develop methodologies that 
may give us better insight into religious feelings, experiences and behavior. 
Furthermore, the body may have a direct role in knowing. Csordas asserts: 
"Somatic modes of attention are culturally elaborated ways of attending to 
and with one's body in surroundings that include the embodied presence of 
others" (Csordas, 1993: 138). Somatic modes of attention, thus, refer to a 
form of sensory engagement that is linked with intersubjectivity. For exam­
ple, when I am dancing with my partner, I am attending to my senses that 
are actively engaged in apprehending his embodied presence. We can 
smoothly move together (and derive pleasure from dancing together) 
because of that direct intersubjectivity. Dancing as a couple, thus, requires 
mutual somatic attention and intersubjective engagement of body/minds; it 
is not a matter of two individuals mentally encoding, transmitting and 
decoding signs which they then mentally translate into direction and motion 
for the relevant parts of their bodies. 
The hypothesis that somatic modes of attention enable us to apprehend or 
know directly through our bodies may help sociologists understand such 
seemingly irrational phenomena as intuition and "gut-level" hunches. It may 
even be related to such cultural elaborations as couvade - the phenomenon 
of men's experience in their own bodies of their wives' pregnancies, including 
the sensation of body-expansion of pregnancy and the pangs of childbirth. 
Csordas (1994) suggests that such somatic modes of attention may account 
for divination and discernment, such as Catholic Charismatics' way of 
discovering the root causes of a person's illness (and, by extension, how best 
to heal that individual). 
Might we better understand some instances of mystical awareness as 
manifestation of bodily ways of knowing? For example, the women mystics 
of the 13th century practiced forms of spirituality that achieved mystical 
union through intense bodily identification with Christ. They sought to 
mystically know Christ's humanity - his "physicality, his corporeality, his 
being-in-the-body-ness" (Bynum, 1991: 129). One particularly female form 
of spirituality, receiving the Eucharist, involved the incorporation of self 
into Christ and Christ into self as a matter of flesh swallowing flesh. Another 
form of spirituality involved fusing with the body on the Cross through 
physical suffering, especially through illness and self-mortification (Bynum, 
1991). 
Particularly interesting, as an example of bodily ways of knowing, is 
the mystical theology of Hadewijch, a 13th-century Beguine (i.e. laywoman, 
living and praying communally with other devoted women who were neither 
cloistered nor had taken religious vows). Hadewijch's writings describe a way 
of knowing and loving God that is both fully mutual and embodied. In 
mystical union, ascetic, erotic, sensual and ecstatic experiences fused. 
Although some male mystics of that period also used erotic images and 
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metaphors in describing mystical union with God, Hadewijch is unique in 
her development of a theology of mutual loving: she and God were mutually 
lover and beloved, conquerer and conquered, receiver and received, 
penetrator and penetrated (Milhaven, 1993). The possibility of bodily ways 
of knowing helps to account for the fact that women mystically knew God 
differently from how men of the same era knew God. It also helps to explain 
why women mystics developed a different way of loving. 
lntersubjective experience 
The unity of body/mind/self makes plausible the idea that religious 
experiences are fully social and even intersubjectively shared. The participa­
tion of "mindful" bodies in ritual action can create an intense sense of 
togetherness. Borrowing an analogy from Schutz ( 1964), Neitz and Spickard 
( 1990) have observed that - like making music together - such shared 
religious experience can create a sense of sharing vivid present time - an 
experiential communion. They interpret these experiences as a resonance of 
several individuals' experiences and thus a sense of sharing "inner time". 
Spickard (1991) suggests, for example, that participants in a Navajo 
"chant" - several days and nights of collective ritual acts - can attune 
their subjective experiences toward the culturally valued sense of harmony 
between the individual, social group and environment. 
Such reinterpretation of intersubjective experiences is applicable to many 
other religious actions. For example, might a pilgrimage be better understood 
as the body/mind/self experiencing a spiritual transition in an emotionally 
and socially shared cultural practice, which is simultaneously an intense 
physical, mindful and socially meaning-laden journey? This approach con­
firms the reality of the whole transformation, rather than viewing the 
pilgrimage as the mere symbol or idea of a hoped-for spiritual development. 
Indeed, it suggests that the physical, emotional and social aspects of the 
journey itself are part of the actual accomplishment of transformation. 
Recognizing the reality of similar intersubjective experiences might help us 
better conceptualize the role of the guru, mimesis of whom leads to self­
transformation. We might better appreciate a deeper meaning of commu­
nion and how body practices (such as sharing a ritual meal) may produce 
intense shared religious experiences. Similarly, the possibility of genuinely 
intersubjective emotional experience deepens our understanding of religious 
qualities such as compassion - literally, co-feeling (Leder, 1990). 
Conclusion 
In order to understand the linkage between religion and the human body, it 
is useful to analyze the many "thoroughfares" through which body, mind, 
self and society interpenetrate. When we speak of "body" we refer simulta­
neously to the lived body, the political body and the social body. Thus, 
religion is both a source of body regulation and constraint, and an avenue 
for resistance to such control; religion both informs and expresses social 
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meanings. Ritual practice may be effective precisely because of its ability to 
metaphorically address and transform the unitary body/mind/self. Further­
more, religion promotes the total involvement and absorption of the body/ 
mind/self, through its use of emotions, imagination, memory, perception 
and senses. 
Sociology of religion needs to start from a unitary conceptualization of 
body in order to better understand not only healing, but also alternative ways 
of knowing (such as mystical awareness) and intense intersubjective 
experience (such as communion and compassion). 
NOTES 
1. The number of "bodies" distinguished by various theorists has proliferated, but 
most of the additional concepts can be adequately subsumed under these three. 
2. This is not Merleau-Ponty's term but the closest English phrase to both his 
meaning and the terms of German phenomenologists, such as Husserl, who were 
exploring similar issues. 
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